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PROTECTING THE BALLONA 
WETLANDS IN WEST LOS ANGELES: A 
LOOK BACK AT THREE DECADES OF 
URBAN HABITAT ADVOCACY 
CARLYLE W. HALL, JR. * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Surrounded by densely populated West Los Angeles, the Ballona 
Wetlands are a remnant of a larger, flourishing coastal ecosystem that 
has been subjected to over a hundred years of urban assault. Ninety-eight 
percent of Los Angeles County’s historic wetlands have been filled and 
developed, and more than a century of abuse and neglect have severely 
degraded the Ballona Wetlands. Nonetheless, the Ballona Wetlands 
remain “one of the most important pieces of wildlife habitat” in the 
region,1 and they constitute the County’s largest remaining coastal 
wetland.2 
* Senior Counsel, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. Mr. Hall is one of California’s leading 
environmental attorneys. For the past forty years, he has participated in many of California’s most 
important and controversial land use legal disputes. 
 1 Nancy Hill-Holtzman, Foes of Playa Vista Project Become its Friends, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
21, 1990, articles.latimes.com/1990-10-21/news/we-4188_1_ballona-wetlands. 
 2 See generally SANTA MONICA BAY RESTORATION COMM’N, BALLONA WETLANDS 
BASELINE ASSESSMENT (2011), available at 
www.santamonicabay.org/smbay/LinkClick.aspx?link=ballona%2FBR+Summary_FINAL.pdf&tabi
d=185; U. S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS FOR SEDIMENT AND 
INVASIVE EXOTIC VEGETATION (2011), available at 
www.epa.gov/region9/water/tmdl/ballona/tmdl_ballona-wetland.pdf [hereinafter USEPA, DRAFT 
TDML]; see also Project Overview 1, BALLONA WETLANDS RESTORATIONS PROJECT, available at 
www.santamonicabay.org/smbay/ProgramsProjects/HabitatRestorationProject/BallonaProjectOvervi
ew/tabid/184/Default.aspx (in the past 200 years, fifty-three percent of the 221 million acres of 
wetlands in the lower forty eight have been lost, with fully ninety-one percent lost in California, 
more than any other state); see generally T.E, DAHL, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., Wetlands 
Losses in the United States 1780s to 1980s (1990), available at 
www.fws.gov/wetlands/_documents/gSandT/NationalReports/WetlandsLossesUS1780sto1980s.pdf. 
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As might be expected when an important, severely endangered 
coastal natural resource located in a highly urbanized urban area is at 
stake, protecting the Ballona Wetlands has been fraught with 
controversy. But, unexpectedly, each of the major players has, over time, 
experienced reversals of position—and of fortune—not commonly 
encountered. 
 
 On the development side, Howard Hughes’s Summa Corporation 
(Summa) initially proposed a massive development scheme 
(approved in 1984) to tear up the wetlands and replace them with 
a futuristic mini-city. These plans were abruptly terminated five 
years later when a pioneering, “green”-oriented developer, 
Maguire Thomas Partners (MTP), acquired the stalled project 
and proposed a completely redesigned, environmentally 
sustainable project. But the financial perils of the huge project 
eventually brought down MTP, and bankers took over the project 
in 1997. When their efforts to woo major Hollywood moguls to 
build a new motion picture studio at the site floundered and 
collapsed in 2003, the bankers chose to sell much of the land to 
the State and to build a substantially downsized project instead. 
 On the environmental side, the Friends of Ballona Wetlands 
(Friends) led a lonely, yearlong litigation struggle against 
Summa’s original plan. When Summa sold the project to MTP in 
1989, the Friends’ litigation settlement established them as 
MTP’s partner in designing and managing a new freshwater 
marsh and a restored, greatly expanded salt marsh. Ultimately, 
however, when MTP’s successors decided in 2003 to sell much 
of the project site to the State, the Friends’ role receded. 
Meanwhile, dissident environmental groups brought a lengthy 
series of lawsuits against the redesigned project, unsuccessfully 
trying to stop it in its entirety. 
 On the government side, during the time Summa was spreading 
lavish political campaign contributions, local and regional 
officials were fully in the developer’s camp. But a strong 
political backlash ensued, and, when MTP abruptly announced 
its intention in 1989 to develop the project in an environmentally 
friendly manner, newly elected city officials and the city’s 
planning bureaucracy cooperated to bring about the new vision. 
Federal, state and regional bureaucracies joined local authorities 
to expedite the needed entitlement approvals and permits. But, 
when both MTP and its successors nonetheless ran out of money, 
the State purchased all of the key wetland areas in 2003 for $139 
million. Since then, however, the State has been unable to 
2
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol6/iss1/5
2012] PROTECTING THE BALLONA WETLANDS  27 
 
aggressively plan and restore the wetlands. 
 
This is a cautionary tale, but it offers hope for the future. When the 
State formulates its Ballona Wetlands restoration plan, the promise of 
revitalization to a natural, healthy coastal wetlands ecosystem may 
finally be realized. 
II. THE BALLONA WETLANDS’ HISTORY 
Originally comprising about 2,120 acres,3 the Ballona Wetlands 
were formed thousands of years ago at the mouth of the Los Angeles 
River. Historically, the Los Angeles River switched its course several 
times a century, sometimes flowing along Ballona Creek into Santa 
Monica Bay at the Ballona Wetlands and sometimes flowing along the 
present Los Angeles River route into what is now Long Beach harbor. 
Complex, changing wetland conditions, including interchange of fresh 
and seawater at Ballona Creek’s ocean outlet, provided a diverse and 
productive habitat, as well as abundant renewable water and food for the 
Tongva and other tribes of ancient humans.4 
By the early 1800s, the Mexican government was making land 
grants in the area, including Augustine Machado’s 14,000-acre “Rancho 
La Ballona” cattle ranch.5 Over time, the Ballona Wetlands were 
partially drained and developed into agricultural uses. In the early 20th 
century, as in much of West Los Angeles, oil was discovered in the 
wetlands; soon, the area was dotted with oil rigs. In the 1920s, 
developers unsuccessfully sought to develop the Ballona area for 
recreation and tourism, including hotels, a hunting lodge, boat and car 
racing facilities, and a fishing pier. Flooding from winter rains, strong 
tides and heavy seas washed them all away, and the wetlands became 
regarded as dangerous and prone to flooding. 
Despite these early urban assaults, millions of birds continued their 
annual migration along the Pacific Flyway, stretching roughly 7,500 
miles from Alaska to South America. About 300 bird species found the 
Ballona Wetlands to be a place where they could still survive in the 
rapidly urbanizing Los Angeles region. Great blue herons continued to 
 3 See CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, BALLONA WETLANDS OVERVIEW AND SUMMARIES, 
available at resources.ca.gov/ballona_wetlands/ballona_wetlands_summaries.pdf. The Ballona 
Creek watershed drains approximately 130 square miles, over ten percent of which is now heavily 
urbanized. See USEPA, DRAFT TDML, supra  note 2, at 15, 56. 
 4 Ballona History, FRIENDS OF BALLONA WETLANDS, www.ballonafriends.org/history.html. 
 5 Id. The origin of the name, “Ballona,” is obscure. Some believe it to be from the Spanish 
word for whales (“ballena”) which may, from time to time, have entered the inner Santa Monica 
Bay, while others think it was from Ballona, Spain, the original home of the Machado family. 
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forage along Ballona Creek and nest in tall nearby trees,6 while 
endangered bird species, like the least tern and the Belding’s savannah 
sparrow, made the Ballona Wetlands their home. 
Then, between the 1930s and 1960s, urban development brought 
devastating blows to the habitat: 
 
 In the 1930s, as a flood control measure, the Army Corps of 
Engineers dredged and cemented the banks and the bottom of the 
then-meandering Ballona Creek, so that the Creek’s fresh water 
would pour directly into the open seas without first draining 
though the wetlands. Channel-related infrastructure also kept salt 
water from ocean tidal flows out of the wetlands.7 
 In the 1940s, Howard Hughes, one of the twentieth century’s 
most iconic business and aviation figures, acquired the 1,000-
acre area that comprised much of the remaining wetlands and 
their undeveloped uplands.8 He developed an extensive airplane 
manufacturing facility in the parcel’s eastern portion, 
constructing eleven buildings on about 150 acres. He built the 
enormous, now-historic Building 15, which is nearly six stories 
high and more than two and a half football fields long, as the 
largest self-supporting wooden structure in the world.9 There, 
the “Spruce Goose”—the largest airplane from wing-tip to wing-
tip ever built—was constructed during World War II.10 Hughes 
also developed a 9,600-foot paved runway, almost two miles in 
length. By the 1950s, over 15,000 Hughes employees worked at 
the site.11 
 The 1960s brought Los Angeles County’s construction of the 
mammoth Marina Del Rey project, which destroyed 
 6 Ballona Habitat, FRIENDS OF BALLONA WETLANDS, www.ballonafriends.org/habitat.html 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
 7 Id. 
 8 In his initial 1940 purchase, Hughes paid the modest sum of $500,000 for about 380 acres. 
See also Jeffrey Rabin, Playa Vista Plan Back on Track as Praise Replaces Hostility, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 29, 1990, articles.latimes.com/1990-01-29/news/mn-770_1_westchester-bluffs. 
 9 PAUL FREEMAN, ABANDONED AND LITTLE KNOWN AIRFIELDS: HUGHES AIRPORT (2001), 
available at members.tripod.com/airfiels_freeman/CA/Airfields_CA_LA_W.htm [hereinafter 
HUGHES AIRPORT]; Robert Welkos, Playa Vista Studios a New Annex for Hollywood?, L.A. TIMES, 
June 21, 1994, articles.latimes.com/1994-06-21/entertainment/ca-6718_1_sound-stages; James 
Rainey, Unscripted Twist Adds Film Studio to Playa Vista Project, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, 
articles.latimes.com/1995-08-21/news/mn-37411_1_film-industry. 
 10 HUGHES AIRPORT, supra note 9. Built for the U.S. military in the midst of World War II 
and made principally from wood, the H-4 (“Hercules”) spanned 320 feet from wingtip to wingtip. 
Only a single prototype was built. It was flown only once, in November 1947, by Hughes himself, 
who was a skilled pilot and had set many air flight world records. 
 11 Id. Hughes continued farming operations on the western portions of the site. 
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approximately 900 acres of the northern wetlands for a vast boat 
marina and a housing/retail mixed-use development.12 
Approximately 2.5 million cubic yards of dredge spoils from the 
construction site were deposited throughout 138 acres of the 
adjacent 1,000-acre Hughes-owned parcel, thereby burying 
essentially all of what later became Playa Vista’s “Area A” 
under approximately fifteen feet of fill.13 
 
By 1980, the Ballona Wetlands ecosystem had basically crashed as 
a result of these drastic changes.14 
III. SUMMA’S ORIGINAL PLAYA VISTA PLAN 
After spending his last years as a reclusive, eccentric billionaire, 
Howard Hughes died in 1976. Considerable controversy, including at 
least one forged will, surrounded the disposition of his estate. Two years 
later, executives of Summa Corporation, which held title to Hughes’ 
enterprises on the wetlands, announced their plans to develop the 
approximately 1,000-acre parcel, a site slightly bigger than New York 
City’s Central Park.15 They proposed to wedge “Playa Vista,” a $1 
billion mega-development—a “city within a city” with a population close 
to Hermosa Beach’s 18,000—into the already congested West Los 
Angeles region. At the time, the Playa Vista site constituted the “largest 
parcel of developable urban land in the United States”16 and was “one of 
the nation’s most valuable pieces of undeveloped urban land.”17 
 12 USEPA, DRAFT TDML, supra note 2, at 47 (“[a]ccommodating more than 5,000 privately 
owned boats, Marina Del Rey is the largest artificial small boat harbor in the United States”). 
 13 Roger Vincent and Martha Groves, L.A.'s Urban Model; After Years of Setbacks and 
Controversy, Playa Vista is Officially Open, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003. For a full discussion of the 
history of the Ballona Wetlands and the various urban infrastructure development activities that 
severely degraded it, see USEPA, DRAFT TDML, supra note 2, at 17-22, 29-60; DANIEL S. COOPER, 
AUDUBON BALLONA WETLANDS PROGRAM, BALLONA WETLANDS TRAINING MANUAL 17-24 
(2004), available at cooperecological.com/ballonatrainingmanualnew.pdf [hereinafter BALLONA 
WETLANDS TRAINING MANUAL]. 
 14 According to the U.S. EPA, as a result of urban development activities during this period, 
Ballona’s vegetated habitat declined by sixty-three percent compared to historic levels to only 155 
acres; intertidal channel habitat declined by twenty-five percent to nineteen acres; and saltpan habitat 
declined by eighty percent to twenty-two acres; while upland habitat increased by over 1400 percent 
to 291 acres. USEPA, DRAFT TDML, supra note 2, at 20, 34, 42. 
 15 Summa closed operations at the Hughes Airport in 1985. HUGHES AIRPORT, supra note 9. 
 16 Ron Russell, Builder Offers Expanded Ballona Wetlands Plan, L.A.TIMES, Jan. 3, 1995, 
articles.latimes.com/1995-01-03/local/me-15845_1_ballona-wetlands-restoration. 
 17 Bill Boyarsky, Stakes Rise in Battle over Playa Vista Development, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
1988, articles.latimes.com/1988-03-01/local/me-144_1_summa. See also James Rainey, Grand Jury 
Criticizes Summa, County Plans for Marina Del Rey, L.A. TIMES, Mar, 24, 1985, 
articles.latimes.com/1985-03-24/news/we-30496_1_grand-jury; Rabin, supra note 8. 
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Accordingly, Summa’s design would preserve only the essentially 
“unbuildable” wetlands.18 
Shortly after Summa’s announcement, Ruth Lansford, a nearby 
resident who had become interested in wetlands preservation, organized 
a group of citizens, environmentalists and scientists to form a non-profit 
environmental group, called “Friends of Ballona Wetlands” (“Friends”), 
to fight the proposed project and to preserve as much of the remaining 
wetlands as feasible. 
Following a lavish public relations campaign that included almost 
$200,000 in campaign contributions to the five Los Angeles County 
Supervisors, close to $100,000 to Los Angeles City Council Members, 
and $25,000 to Mayor Tom Bradley, Summa obtained the needed local 
entitlements to develop. In 1984, the California Coastal Commission 
(CCC) granted its approval.19 As approved, the Summa plan called for 
construction of 8,837 residential units; approximately six million square 
feet of commercial/office/light industrial uses, including a series of high 
rise office towers; about one million square feet of retail space, including 
a large regional shopping center; 2,400 hotel rooms; and a new forty-acre 
marina. Only about 170 acres of the 1000-acre parcel would be preserved 
as wetlands.20 
IV. THE FRIENDS’ LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT 
In December 1984, Friends sued.21 Lansford had contacted 
attorneys from the Center for Law in the Public Interest (CLIPI), a non-
profit public interest law firm, founded in 1971 as one of six such firms 
in the nation largely funded by the Ford Foundation. In its first decade, 
CLIPI had successfully fought several other mega-projects, and it offered 
its legal services to the Friends on a pro bono basis. CLIPI’s complaint 
focused on alleged violations of the Coastal Act, contending that the 
CCC had improperly underestimated the amount of wetlands acreage 
meriting Coastal Act protection22 and unlawfully authorized construction 
 18 Summa proposed to locate condominiums, a golf course and an exclusive senior citizen 
housing project within the marshland area. Martha Groves, A Patch of Blue at Playa Vista, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2003, articles.latimes.com/2003/apr/18/local/me-marsh18. 
 19 Boyarsky, Stakes Rise in Battle over Playa Vista Development, supra note 17. 
 20 See generally Rainey, supra note 17; James Rainey, Residents File Suit, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
2, 1986, articles.latimes.com/1986-01-02/news/we-23728_1_environmental-report; Boyarsky, supra 
note 17; Bill Boyarsky, Joint Venture Formed to Develop Property in Playa Del Rey, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 16, 1989, articles.latimes.com/1989-02-16/local/me-3636_1_develop-del-rey. 
 21 Friends of Ballona Wetlands v. The California Coastal Commission, No. C525 82, 1984 
L.A. Super. Ct. Two other groups, the League for Coastal Protection and the League of Women 
Voters, and an individual, Mary Thomson, also joined as plaintiffs in the lawsuit. 
 22 See generally Rainey, Residents File Suit, supra note 20. 
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of a major road (the Falmouth Avenue Extension) through the wetlands. 
The lawsuit also alleged critical procedural errors, including a series of 
“behind closed doors” meetings between Summa’s representatives and 
CCC Commissioners and the CCC’s refusal to allow CLIPI to obtain 
discovery during the administrative proceedings about the ex parte 
meetings. The CCC, Los Angeles County and the City of Los Angeles, 
each of which had approved some portion of the Summa project 
entitlements, were named as defendants. 
The litigation dragged on for nearly five years.23 Meanwhile, 
Summa obtained Los Angeles City approval to build another project, 
called the “Howard Hughes Center,” on a nearby sixty-nine acre parcel 
to the east of Playa Vista that abutted the 405 Freeway. As with Playa 
Vista, approvals for the Howard Hughes Center authorized high-rise 
office towers up to twenty stories tall, and, as the project was being 
constructed, the general public saw a strange “space age” vision that 
Summa executives appeared to have for the area.24 Momentum began to 
shift against Summa when, in June 1987, its champion on the Los 
Angeles City Council, Pat Russell, who represented the district in which 
the Playa Vista project was to be developed, suffered a stunning political 
defeat at the hands of Ruth Galanter, a former CCC Commissioner and 
close ally of Ruth Lansford, the head of the Friends.25 
An even more dramatic turn occurred in February 1989, when 
Nelson Rising of Maguire Thomas Partners (MTP) led a take over of the 
Summa project in which MTP became managing partner, while Summa 
was relegated to the role of landowner/passive investor.26 A local 
attorney and businessman who had graduated from UCLA and UCLA 
School of Law, Rising had successfully guided the Library Square 
 23 Besides the author, CLIPI attorneys who worked on the Ballona Wetlands litigation during 
its early years included Joel Reynolds, Fred Woocher and Lucas Guttentag. Another group, the 
Venice Town Council, also later filed suit in January 1986, after Los Angeles City annexed much of 
the 1,000-acre parcel and approved the environmental impact report (EIR) for the project’s traffic 
and sewage impacts. See Rainey, Residents File Suit, supra note 20. 
 24 The Howard Hughes Center’s plan allowed 2.7 million square feet of office uses. Alan 
Citron, Development Key Issue, Russell on Defensive, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1987, 
articles.latimes.com/1987-02-12/news/we-2772_1_development-policies. 
 25 Frank Clifford and Victor Merina, Galanter, Holden Win in Council Voting, L.A. TIMES, 
June 3, 1987, articles.latimes.com/print/1987-06-03/news/mn-2700_1_public-office. By helping to 
convince MTP executives that its best interests lay in reaching a mutual accommodation with the 
Friends, Council member Galanter played a crucial role in bringing about the Friends/MTP 
settlement. She also pressed MTP to include hundreds of affordable housing units in the Playa Vista 
project. 
 26 John Lawrence, Nice Profits From A Better City Life, FORTUNE MAG., Oct. 9, 1989, 
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1989/10/09/72557/index.htm. At the time, MTP 
was the largest commercial developer in the United States in terms of billings for commercial 
construction. 
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project in downtown Los Angeles. To much public acclaim, this project 
restored the City’s historic central public library in return for 
development approvals and credits on the seventy-three story First 
Interstate World Center tower (the tallest building west of the Mississippi 
River) and the fifty-two story Gas Company building.27 
Whereas Summa favored a behind-closed-doors, campaign-
contributions-based planning style, Rising advocated transparent, 
environmentally sensitive planning, along with extensive outreach to 
neighboring residents and communities. Before the term “smart growth” 
became an important term in the planning lexicon, Rising envisioned a 
sustainable Playa Vista as “something completely different in urban 
design in Southern California.” A “campus-style” Playa Vista would 
employ a predominately low-rise, two to four-story “Santa Barbara 
Spanish” architectural design. The redesigned project would have a more 
suitable job/housing balance, a variety of features to encourage walking 
and discourage automobile use, and a public image of preserving, not 
trashing, the environment.28 Importantly, Rising saw a strong, emerging 
market among potential buyers and lessees for this sort of development.29 
Shortly after MTP took over Playa Vista, the City of Los Angeles 
brought several motions in early 1989 designed to bring the litigation to a 
conclusion without a trial. Superior Court Judge Miriam Vogel listened 
to the arguments and indicated that she gave some weight to the City’s 
contentions. Jo Powe, who was opposing the motions on behalf of the 
Friends, informed the Court that MTP had recently taken over the 
project. Because MTP was considering substantial project revisions that 
might be agreeable to the Friends,30 she suggested that it might be 
 27 Id.; Boyarsky, Joint Venture Formed to Develop Property in Playa Del Rey, supra note 20. 
 28 No residential structures would be taller than 6 stories, and no commercial buildings would 
exceed 10 stories, lower than the nearby Westchester bluffs. Boyarsky, Joint Venture Formed to 
Develop Property in Playa Del Rey, supra note 20. Rising explained that Playa Vista would have 
“neighborhoods where everyone is within six minutes walking distance of a town center. People will 
not need their cars to get from one place to another.”  Julio Moran, Scaled-Back Playa Vista 
Building Plan Is Released, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1989, articles.latimes.com/1989-06-30/local/me-
2844_1_retail-space-open-space-mid-rise. Los Angeles City Council Member Ruth Galanter later 
described the revised Playa Vista project’s design as being “as close to smart growth as you’ll find 
anywhere in this country.” James Sterngold, A Little Piece of Los Angeles Is a Wide Open 
Battleground, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2001, www.nytimes.com/2001/08/18/us/a-little-piece-of-los-
angeles-is-a-wide-open-battleground.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
 29 See generally Matthew Parlow, Greenwashed?: Developers, Environmental 
Consciousness and the Case of Playa Vista, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 513 (2008), available at 
lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=ealr (discussing MTP’s 
“proactively green” embrace of sustainable development principles as a “model of environmental 
consciousness”). 
 30 Summa had recently resolved payment of its estate taxes owed to California by 
transferring Area A to the State, while retaining an option to repurchase it and build it out as part of 
the Playa Vista development. Powe pointed out to Judge Vogel that the new State Controller, Grey 
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appropriate to refer the case to a mandatory settlement conference before 
the Court made its rulings. Judge Vogel did exactly that. 
Nelson Rising and I both attended that Court argument. We knew 
each other well. In fact, by coincidence, almost two decades earlier in 
1971, Rising had raised the critical initial seed money that enabled me 
and other CLIPI co-founders to gather the other monies needed to start 
CLIPI. Rising had also served on CLIPI’s board of trustees during its 
first several years, and we had grown to trust and respect each other. 
Following the Court argument, we promptly launched a series of 
settlement discussions. 
By the end of 1989, the Friends and MTP had agreed on the basic 
parameters of the settlement. As a Friends’ spokesperson later 
emphasized, “[o]ur issue is not the development per se. It is the wetlands 
and whether or not the proposed development will have an adverse 
impact on the wetlands.”31 From the Friends’ standpoint, the settlement 
would accomplish their most important objectives: 
 
 The wetlands area to be preserved would expand to 270 acres. 
Besides preserving the entire area of salt marsh that the Friends’ 
experts delineated, MTP would spend about $18 million to 
construct a new twenty-five acre freshwater marsh and a twenty-
six acre riparian corridor leading to it. MTP would have 
responsibility in perpetuity for maintaining the desired water 
quality standards in the newly constructed freshwater marsh.32 
This new freshwater marsh component would serve as flood 
control for the development project, but it would also provide 
critical new habitat for birds and wildlife, while filtering the 
fresh water runoff before it flowed into the salt marsh and then 
drained to the sea.33 
 The salt marsh would be restored to a fully functioning natural 
habitat. In consultation with their respective expert advisors, the 
Davis, whose office controlled the newly transferred parcel, had also opened discussions with MTP 
and the Friends about facilitating a more environmentally acceptable Playa Vista redesign. 
 31 Greg Krikorian, Hearing Reveals Growing Optimism About Playa Vista Project, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, articles.latimes.com/1992-12-06/local/me-3327_1_ruth-lansford. 
 32 As part of the settlement, MTP agreed to the California Coastal Commission’s imposing 
numerous Special Conditions on its construction of the freshwater marsh, which required MTP to 
demonstrate that the freshwater marsh was successfully established and that it met specified 
biological and water quality standards that substantially exceeded baseline conditions. Additionally, 
MTP had to devise financing and institutional mechanisms that would ensure the freshwater marsh 
met the specified standards in perpetuity. 
 33 See Rabin, supra note 8; Jeffrey Rabin, Workshops Let Residents Air Views on Playa Vista 
Project, L.A.TIMES, July 15, 1990, articles.latimes.com/1990-07-15/local/me-192_1_westchester-
bluffs/2; Russell, supra note 16; Groves, supra note 18. 
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Friends and MTP would jointly plan the salt marsh restoration. 
MTP committed $10 million (which later increased to $13 
million) to complete the restoration and to establish a long-term 
maintenance fund.34 Experts for both the Friends and MTP 
agreed that this would be an adequate sum for a mid-tidal 
restoration, in which ocean waters would reach much of the 
marsh through ordinary tidal action.35 The fifty-one acre 
freshwater marsh construction, the 191-acre salt marsh 
restoration, as well as ninety acres of bluff restoration on the 
project’s southern edge and eight acres of sand dunes to be 
restored along the western edge, would total approximately 340 
acres of new and restored habitat.36 
 Because the ongoing lack of fresh and salt water continued to 
degrade the marsh, MTP was required to construct the freshwater 
marsh in the near-term and not leave it as an afterthought. 
Accordingly, the settlement precluded MTP from developing 
Phase One of the project until the freshwater marsh construction 
was approved and underway, while it could not start developing 
Phase Two until the salt marsh restoration was approved and 
underway. 
 More immediately, in order to help prevent further rapid 
wetlands deterioration, MTP committed $750,000 to fund an 
interim restoration program. This money would fund redesign 
and installation of new flap gates between the Ballona Creek 
channel and the salt marsh, allowing a more adequate interim 
supply of seawater to enter the salt marsh. Once the freshwater 
marsh construction was completed, the salt marsh would then 
 34 Russell, supra note 16. 
 35 At the time of the settlement, the Friends and MTP viewed a “full tidal” salt marsh 
restoration (with saltwater flows in the range of six feet) as optimal, but they also considered a “mid-
tidal” restoration (with culverts from Ballona Creek channel allowing a lesser range in tidal action) 
as a desirable and attainable goal. Full-tidal flows would be considerably more costly and difficult to 
achieve, because existing public and private infrastructure and development in and around the 
wetlands would have to be removed or modified. Accordingly, the settlement provided that MTP 
would use its “best efforts” to raise an additional $30 million, the estimated cost of a full tidal 
restoration within Area B. The Friends and MTP viewed numerous off-site mitigation programs of 
the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach as feasible sources of funding for the full-tidal option. See 
James Rainey, Galanter Opponents See A Backlash, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1991, 
articles.latimes.com/1991-02-17/news/we-1756_1_6th-district; Russell, supra note 16. Michael 
Josselyn, a highly respected wetlands biologist, served as the Friends’ primary wetlands consultant. 
Architect Douglas Gardener was MTP’s project manager, and Jacob Lipa and Sharon Lockhart were 
among its primary wetlands consultants. All are outstanding practitioners in their fields. The 
settlement provided that MTP would pay the Friends’ costs of retaining expert consultants and 
attorneys to assist it in designing the wetlands restoration and generally implementing the settlement. 
 36 Russell, supra note 16. 
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receive both freshwater and saltwater flows, even before full 
restoration was accomplished. Additionally, the interim funding 
would pay for restoration of the eight-acre sand dunes area at the 
wetlands’ western edge. 
 The Falmouth Avenue Extension, which would have served as 
an essential traffic mitigation measure for Summa’s project 
design but would have bisected the wetlands, would now be 
eliminated. 
 The Court would appoint a referee to oversee the settlement, 
enforce timely compliance with all schedules, and resolve any 
disputes.37 
 Presciently, the Friends also insisted that the settlement 
provisions would “run with the land” and bind any MTP 
successors. 
 
As MTP “drastically altered” the Playa Vista project, its own goals 
were to meet the Friends’ environmental demands, while also providing 
for ample development and profit from build out of what would still be 
one of the biggest building projects in the city’s history.38 From MTP’s 
point of view, the settlement would accomplish those objectives: 
 
 In order to shift the development from the expanded wetlands, 
about 2,300 residential units and 70,000 square feet of retail 
space would be relocated from Area B (the 338-acre portion of 
the parcel west of Lincoln Boulevard and south of Culver 
Boulevard in which the principal wetlands were located) to Area 
D (the large 545-acre area east of Lincoln Blvd. and south of the 
Ballona Creek channel, which included the areas previously 
developed by Hughes). A six-story senior citizen housing 
complex planned for Area B’s west corner would be eliminated. 
Together, these changes would preserve another forty-seven 
acres of Area B’s marshland. 
 By eliminating the Falmouth Avenue Extension, MTP would 
lose a considerable number of traffic mitigation credits. To gain 
equivalent credits, MTP would reduce retail space to about 
595,000 square feet by eliminating a proposed 250,000 square 
feet regional shopping center, and it would lower the 
commercial/office space to about five million square feet, by 
 37 E. Clement Shute, an environmental public interest lawyer based in San Francisco, became 
the first referee and served for sixteen years until 2006. At that time, Dan Selmi, a professor of land 
use and environmental law at Loyola law school in Los Angeles, was appointed successor referee. 
 38 Rabin, supra note 8. 
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deleting approximately one million square feet of commercial 
high-rise towers. To compensate for these reductions, the total 
number of residential units would increase from almost 9,000 
units to about 12,000 units.39 The Revised Playa Vista Plan 
would house approximately 24,000 residents and provide 20,000 
jobs along with shops, offices and hotels.40 
 
Although the proposed settlement would accomplish most, but not 
all, of the Friends’ goals, two problems led to substantial internal debate 
within the Friends. First, MTP wanted the Friends to publicly support its 
development plans, which, MTP argued, would be generating the funds 
needed to accomplish the wetlands restoration. The Friends felt they 
could not do this, because the development would have other negative 
impacts (e.g., generating large amounts of traffic in an already congested 
region). Further, because the impacts that Playa Vista’s development 
could have on the wetlands restoration—as well as ways to mitigate 
those impacts—had not yet been fully evaluated in a project EIR, the 
Friends felt it necessary to reserve their rights to comment on the draft 
EIR. They also insisted that their public support of the development 
project be limited to stating simply that they did not believe it would 
have an adverse impact on the wetlands and, if they determined it would 
have an adverse wetlands impact, they could withdraw any support. 
Second, the Friends wanted all of the development proposed for 
Area B, the 338-acre portion that included the principal wetlands, to be 
relocated or eliminated. MTP, however, insisted that approximately 
1,800 dwelling units proposed for development on fifty-four acres in the 
northeast corner of Area B could not economically be relocated or 
eliminated.41 After much internal debate, the Friends concluded that the 
Project EIR would later provide the needed analysis of the impacts from 
 39 Moran, supra note 28; Rabin, supra note 8; Jeffrey Rabin, Playa Vista Developers Plan 
Public Workshop, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1990, articles.latimes.com/1990-07-08/news/we-
362_1_public-workshops. Pursuant to MTP’s discussions with Councilmember Galanter, 
approximately 15 percent of the residential units would be affordable to low and moderate-income 
families. Playa Vista characterized its affordable housing component as “unprecedented,” “the most 
far-reaching commitment of any project in Los Angeles history.” Kenneth Agid, Playa Vista Project 
Provides Urban Solutions for L.A., L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2000, 
articles.latimes.com/2000/mar/20/entertainment/ca-10683. 
 40 Moran, supra note 28; Rabin, Workshops Let Residents Air Views on Playa Vista Project, 
supra note 33; James Rainey, Galanter Opponents See a Backlash, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1991, 
articles.latimes.com/1991-02-17/news/we-1756_1_6th-district; Jeffrey Rabin, Report Outlines 
Impact of Huge Playa Vista Project, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, articles.latimes.com/1992-10-
02/news/mn-336_1_impact-reports. 
 41 See generally Jeffrey Rabin, Battle Over Developing Wetlands is Nearing End, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1989, articles.latimes.com/1989-12-11/local/me-95_1_ballona-wetlands. 
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this nearby development on the wetlands. If the impacts were minor, they 
could be mitigated; if they turned out to be major, the Friends could 
withdraw their support and demand that the City impose appropriate 
conditions to address those impacts. 
On October 18, 1990, the Friends and MTP executed the settlement 
agreement calling for the Revised Playa Vista Plan. At the press 
conference held later that day, MTP’s Rising asserted that the settlement 
removed a “major roadblock to Playa Vista’s development.” The 
Friends’ Lansford said it showed that “you can fight City Hall.” She 
praised MTP’s “uniquely cooperative” approach to the Playa Vista 
redesign.42 But much more work remained. In particular, environmental 
impact studies under both CEQA and NEPA would have to evaluate the 
impacts of both the development complex and the wetlands restoration 
effort. Following approvals of the needed entitlements, estimated to 
occur by 1992, MTP envisioned that it could complete project build-out 
in eight to ten years, or about 2002.43 
During the next two decades, however, Playa Vista’s ownership 
would again change hands, and the developer’s leadership team would 
change several times. Ultimately, much of the 1,000-acre Playa Vista site 
would be sold to the State. 
 
 
V. INITIAL EFFORTS TO DEVELOP PLAYA VISTA CONSISTENT WITH 
THE REVISED PLAN 
 
During the next four years (1990-94), MTP worked closely with 
Los Angeles City planners to study the overall environmental impacts of 
the Revised Playa Vista Plan. In late 1992, a 28,000 page administrative 
draft of the environmental impact report (EIR) for the entire Revised 
Playa Vista Plan was made public. The administrative draft EIR noted 
that, even after the settlement-related revisions, Playa Vista would 
remain “one of the biggest [developments] in Los Angeles history.”44 
Indeed, the cost of full project build-out had risen to an estimated $7 
billion.45 
 42 Hill-Holtzman, supra note 1. 
 43 Rabin, Workshops Let Residents Air Views on Playa Vista Project, supra note 33. 
 44 Rabin, Report Outlines Impacts of Huge Playa Vista Project, supra note 40; Jeffrey Rabin, 
Playa Vista Report Raises New Questions, L.A. TIMES, Jan.10, 1993, articles.latimes.com/1993-01-
10/news/we-1710_1_environmental-impact. 
 45 The total project was estimated to create roughly 137,000 jobs and pump nearly $13 
billion into the local economy over its ten-year build-out. Ron Russell, Report Cites Benefits of 
Playa Vista Project, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1993, articles.latimes.com/1993-07-26/local/me-
17134_1_developers-and-opponents. 
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A separate 2,000 page EIR more specifically analyzed the impacts 
of MTP’s proposed “Phase One” development, which encompassed Area 
D’s eastern portion, utilized for forty years by the Hughes airplane 
manufacturing facilities, and its western portion bordering Lincoln 
Boulevard. The Phase One EIR concluded that the proposed Area D 
development would not have an adverse impact on restoration of the 
wetlands.46 In September 1993, the City Council approved the Phase One 
EIR and project entitlements, including the freshwater marsh. Under the 
Phase One approvals, MTP could build about one quarter of the overall 
proposed project: 3,246 dwelling units; one-and-a-quarter million square 
feet of commercial/office/light industrial uses; and 35,000 square feet of 
neighborhood serving retail stores.47 
Concurrently, in order to take more immediate steps to stop the on-
going degradation of the wetlands caused by lack of fresh and seawater, 
the Friends and MTP made the interim restoration measures a top 
priority. After the Friends concurred in the design of the freshwater 
marsh system, MTP obtained a permit from the Army Corps of 
Engineers that authorized the necessary dredging and filling for the 
freshwater marsh system and began to construct it, thereby providing a 
potentially abundant freshwater supply for the marsh.48 The Friends and 
MTP also began examining options to replace the rusty flap gates at the 
Ballona Creek barrier with a new tidal gate system that would allow 
muted tidal flows of seawater to return to the salt marsh on an interim 
basis. Additionally, utilizing the volunteer efforts of hundreds of 
participants, the Friends launched a dunes restoration program along the 
western edge of Area B. 
Throughout this four-year period, the Friends and MTP also worked 
hard to design the long-term salt marsh restoration and to obtain the 
agreement of the other parties to sign on to the overall parameters of the 
Friends/MTP settlement.49 Meanwhile, MTP’s Nelson Rising spent 
 46 Krikorian, supra note 31. 
 47 See Rabin, Playa Vista Report Raises New Questions, supra note 44. MTP also began 
negotiations in the early 1990s to obtain a small 1.8-acre strip of County-owned land that would give 
access to the ocean to Area A, the 138-acre quadrant where MTP still proposed to construct a marina 
and hotel development. Although located near the ocean and on the Ballona Creek channel, no 
portion of Playa Vista actually has direct access to the ocean. South of Ballona Creek, the Del Rey 
Lagoon and several dozen long-existing homes separate Area B’s wetlands and dunes from the 
ocean. North of the Creek, a narrow strip of County-owned land, containing a lifeguard stand and 
sheriff’s facility, separates Area A from the ocean. 
 48 Ironically, several dissident project opponent groups filed a lawsuit seeking to block 
construction of the freshwater marsh. The Ninth Circuit flatly rejected the dissidents’ claims. See 
Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 222 F. 3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 49 The stipulated settlement, executed by all parties and entitled “Stipulation for Entry of 
Judgment,” was filed with the Superior Court on June 7, 1994. 
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much of his time flying around the United States and the world seeking 
additional project financing for the Playa Vista build out. He encountered 
substantial difficulties, however, partly because the world economy was 
in a decline that hit Southern California’s real estate market especially 
hard, and partly because the Playa Vista project was enormous in scope, 
risky to bring to market, and front loaded with costly infrastructure and 
other development costs, while profit was unlikely to be generated for 
many years.50 By the end of 1994, Rising decided to assume the position 
as CEO of Catellus Development Corporation, which, as the successor to 
the Southern Pacific Railroad’s non-rail assets, was the largest private 
landowner in California. For the next eleven years, Rising devoted 
himself to designing and overseeing San Francisco’s highly successful 
Mission Bay mixed-use development project. 
MTP hired Peter Denniston, a former Irvine Company official, to 
replace Rising. Starting in the 1990s, Denniston supported two 
significant changes in the Revised Playa Vista Plan, one that the Friends 
encouraged, and one that they questioned. 
First, Denniston proposed to replace the Area A boat marina 
development with a large recreational lagoon that would receive tidal 
flows from the ocean. Overlooking the new lagoon, MTP would build 
the hotel and condominium development that the Revised Playa Vista 
Plan allowed, and it would also restore additional Area A land to natural 
habitat. Although the Friends had many concerns about the details, they 
welcomed the idea of replacing the marina with a recreational lagoon and 
substantial new natural habitat. 
Second, Denniston proposed modifications needed to accommodate 
a glamorous Playa Vista anchor project, a new DreamWorks SKG movie 
studio to be constructed at the forty-seven acre site of the former Hughes 
aircraft manufacturing facility in the eastern portion of Area D. Steven 
Spielberg, Jeff Katzenberg and David Geffen had formed DreamWorks 
SKG Studios only a couple of years earlier, and they very much wanted 
to build Hollywood’s first new studio complex in more than sixty 
years.51 The Playa Vista site appealed because Hughes’ enormous 
 50 By the 1990s, estimated costs for the total Revised Playa Vista Plan had risen to about $8 
billion. The Los Angeles Times reported that the projected cost of Playa Vista’s needed 
infrastructure, such as streets, sewers, storm drains and the electrical grid, had alone reached an 
“exorbitant” $700 million. Rainey, supra note 9; Editorial, The City Hopes its Dream Works; L.A. 
Officials Unite in Offering Incentives to Studio, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1995, 
articles.latimes.com/1995-12-12/local/me-13031_1_city-council. According to The Los Angeles 
Times, the financial community attributed Play Vista’s project financing difficulties to its huge costs 
and the failure to break the project into “smaller units” that could be “securitized and sold in 
financial markets.” James Flanigan, Dream Project That Could Yet Come True, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
20, 1996, articles.latimes.com/1996-11-20/business/fi-932_1_dreamworks-principals. 
 51 Lorenza Munoz, DreamWorks Complex Takes Step Closer to Reality, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 
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Building 15 already had a reputation as a fine place for indoor shooting 
of major motion pictures,52 and because MTP promised them ample 
room in a campus-style, West Los Angeles setting.53 The DreamWorks 
proposal required changes to the Phase One EIR and entitlements. It 
envisioned a newly excavated private eight-acre lake adjacent to the 
DreamWorks executive offices, which would be located in a $250 
million, technically innovative “creative campus setting” with about 
7,000 workers. Negotiations over the price, the parcel size and the 
control of the development extended over the next four years.54 MTP 
pursued the needed EIR revisions and helped negotiate a series of public 
subsidies that DreamWorks sought from the City as an inducement to 
locate in Los Angeles, rather than other competing nearby cities.55 Along 
with much of the general public, the Friends questioned the feasibility of 
the DreamWorks deal. But they were not in a position to dictate to MTP 
its choice of buyers/tenants, and they could only protest the lengthy 
delays the DreamWorks negotiations were causing. 
In December 1995, the Los Angeles City Council approved the 
DreamWorks modifications.56 At a splashy news conference held in 
cavernous Building 15 the next day, scores of politicians and Hollywood 
heavy-hitters watched Mayor Richard Riorden declare it “the biggest 
business win any city ever had.” Governor Pete Wilson jested that, if he 
were the Los Angeles Mayor, he would have “sold [his] family to get a 
project like this.”57 DreamWorks’ Jeff Katzenberg proclaimed that the 
1995, articles.latimes.com/1995-12-09/local/me-12048_1_building-permit. 
 52 Blockbuster movies shot in Building 15 included “Apollo 13,” “Batman Forever” and 
“Independence Day.” Rainey, Unscripted Twist Adds Film Studio to Playa Vista Project, supra note 
9. More recently, much of the high-grossing movie, “Avatar,” was filmed there. John Horn, Director 
Cameron to Shoot Again, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2007, www.latimes.com/entertainment/news/la-et-
cameron8jan8.O.1470846.story. 
 53 Joel Wilgoren & Nancy Rivera Brooks, Studio Deal a Hit with City Council, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 6, 1995, articles.latimes.com/1995-12-06/local/me-10950_1_city-council-members. 
 54 See Rainey, supra note 9; James Rainey, Playa Vista Project Gets Key City OK, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1995, articles.latimes.com/1995-10-14/local/me-56821_1_marina-del-rey; Jean Merl 
& James Bates, Council Gives Initial OK to DreamWorks Studio Deal, L.A. TIMES, Dec.13, 1995, 
articles.latimes.com/1995-12-13/news/mn-13522_1_council-members; James Bates, DreamWorks 
Kills Studio Plan for Playa Vista, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1999, 
articles.latimes.com/1999/jul/02/news/mn-52300; Todd Purdum, Spielberg and Partners Drop Long-
Troubled Plan to Build Big Studio Complex, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1999, 
www.nytimes.com/1999/07/03/us/spielberg-and-partners-drop-long-troubled-plan-to-build-big-
studio-complex.html?src=pm. 
 55 MTP and DreamWorks sought between $70 and $100 million in public “concessions” 
from Los Angeles City and other public agencies. The massive incentive package was “unique for 
Los Angeles.” James Rainey, DreamWorks Picks L.A. Site for Studio, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995, 
articles.latimes.com/1995-12-05/news/mn-10465_1_city-council. 
 56 Munoz, supra note 51. 
 57 David Ferrell, Spielberg Notes Hollywood Twist for Dream Works, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
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Council’s approval would “forever change” how the business world 
perceives the City and that the new studio would “cement Los Angeles as 
the media capital of the world.”58 
VI. PCC TAKES OVER THE PROJECT AND ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP 
PLAYA VISTA CONSISTENT WITH THE REVISED PLAN 
As the DreamWorks negotiations dragged on, MTP’s continuing 
difficulty in raising additional funds to finance its development project 
began to undercut its negotiating position, as DreamWorks could not be 
sure that MTP would deliver on its promises. MTP still had no revenue 
stream generating cash flow, and, in 1997, when MTP essentially ran out 
of cash for the project, its financial backers instituted foreclosure 
proceedings.59 When the bankers refused to provide MTP with any more 
funding for the project, MTP had little choice but to approve a term sheet 
for the sale of its Playa Vista interests to Goldman Sachs, Morgan 
Stanley, and Dean Witter, which together had acquired the troubled MTP 
debt from the Wall Street banks.60 In October 1997, MTP sold its Playa 
Vista interests to Playa Capital Company (PCC), a new entity formed by 
the buyers to manage their interests. In exchange for majority ownership, 
the new owners pledged an infusion of $200 million in badly needed 
funds.61 
As PCC stepped into the role of master planned community 
developer, it committed to implementing the Revised Playa Vista Plan 
with Denniston’s proposed alternations. In particular, PCC aggressively 
continued to pursue DreamWorks. By 1998, PCC thought it had an 
agreement in which DreamWorks would pay $20 million ($13 million 
cash up front and $7 million in promissory notes) for forty-seven acres. 
But a year later, in July 1999, DreamWorks pulled out.62 The Daily 
Variety, the industry journal, was quick to headline the news: “Hasta La 
Playa Vista, Baby.”63 Katzenberg explained, “It was a very grand, 
exciting idea . . . five years ago. And maybe it was just a little too 
1995, articles.latimes.com/1995-12-14/local/me-13876_1_howard-hughes. 
 58 Merl & Bates, supra note 54. 
 59 James Bates & Jesus Sanchez, Agreement May Ward Off Foreclosure on Playa Vista, L.A. 
TIMES, July 3, 1997, articles.latimes.com/1997/jul/03/business/fi-9253. By early 1996, Wall Street 
banks, including Chase Manhattan and Bank of America, had loaned MTP approximately $150 
million. See Flanigan, supra note 50. 
 60 Bates & Sanchez, supra note 59. 
 61 See Abigail Goldman, A Look Ahead: After Years of Delays, Developers of the 1,087-Acre, 
Multibillion-Dollar Playa Vista Project Near LAX Are Poised to Break Ground, L.A. TIMES, May 
25, 1998, articles.latimes.com/1998/may/25/local/me-53300. 
 62 Bates, supra note 54. 
 63 Purdum, supra note 54. 
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grand.”64 PCC’s Denniston had earlier lamented the rancorous 
negotiations: “The deal is clearly one where DreamWorks’ limits were 
tested and where our limits were tested.”65 Nonetheless, Denniston now 
claimed to be pleased that PCC now had “more control” over its destiny 
and would not be “in DreamWorks’ shadow.”66 
If it was not clear in 1999 that Denniston was whistling in the dark, 
it became clear two years later in 2001, when PCC still had no major 
anchor tenant. Rather than holding to MTP’s approach of trying to build 
the project with a unified vision, PCC entered into agreements with 
seven independent builders in early 2000. Within overall Playa Vista 
architectural standards, these builders would construct the first 1,600 
residential units according to their preferred architectural approaches.67 
But as of 2001, almost eight years after the City’s approval of the Phase 
One entitlements, not a single residence had been completed.68 Indeed, 
during the dozen years that MTP and PCC owned the Playa Vista 
project, they had generated no meaningful cash flow from its operations, 
while their ongoing management and construction costs had been huge.69 
Further, as PCC focused on DreamWorks and other Area D projects, its 
energies and resources were diverted from processing the entitlements 
needed to develop Areas A, B and C. Beyond the Phase One approvals 
that it had obtained in 1993, PCC still had no entitlements for the rest of 
Revised Playa Vista Plan. 
 64 Claudia Eller & James Bates, Dreamworks Wakes Up to Reality, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 
1999, articles.latimes.com/1999/jul/13/business/fi-55382-2. As its reasons for moving on, 
DreamWorks officials cited Playa Vista’s many “delays” and the higher costs of financing in the 
commercial real estate market. Bates, supra note 54. 
 65 DreamWorks and Developers Agree to Terms for Movie Studio, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 
1998, at A24. 
 66 Jesus Sanchez, At Playa Vista, Plot Takes a New Turn, Plot Takes a New Turn, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 31, 1999, articles.latimes.com/1999/aug/31/business/fi-5239. 
 67 Monte Morin, Playa Vista Signs Deals for 1st Homes, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, 
articles.latimes.com/2000/feb/17/local/me-65345; Jesus Sanchez, Home Builders Still Dedicated to 
Playa Vista Despite Delays, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, 
articles.latimes.com/2001/feb/13/business/fi-24730. 
 68 See Michael Stremfel, Buildings Rise as End to Years of Bitter Dispute Nears, L.A. BUS. 
J., Oct. 29, 2001, www.allbusiness.com/north-america/united-states-california-metro-areas/820578-
1.html. Construction on the new residences was scheduled to start in the fall of 2001, while a 
250,000-square-foot office project, called Water’s Edge, was to be completed in late 2002. 
 69 PCC’s President Steve Soboroff later explained that the Playa Vista project “really [had] 
only two phases,” and the land to be developed had “sat dormant” for many years, making it a 
“difficult financial investment.” Steve Soboroff’s Enthusiasm for Playa Vista is Contagious, THE 
PLANNING REPORT (Nov. 19, 2003), www.planningreport.com/2003/11/19/steve-soboroffs-
enthusiasm-playa-vista-contagious. 
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VII. PCC SELLS THE MAJORITY OF THE PLAYA VISTA SITE TO THE 
STATE 
In August 2001, PCC decided to take a fundamentally different 
approach. It knew that the Planning and Conservation League and other 
environmental groups were discussing possible circulation of what 
became Proposition 50, an initiative petition asking the State’s voters to 
approve more than $3 billion dollars in bonds for open space acquisitions 
by the State for clean water purposes.70 Purchase of the Ballona 
Wetlands would perfectly fit the contemplated acquisition criteria. PCC 
began discussions with the Trust for Public Lands (TPL), which had 
experience in bringing together many similar acquisitions in California 
and other states. 
On August 8, 2001, PCC granted TPL an option to purchase, at a 
price to be determined, 192 acres of the Playa Vista project, including all 
138 acres of Area A and the fifty-four acres in the northeast corner of 
Area B that were scheduled to be developed for residential uses under the 
Revised Playa Vista Plan. Upon TPL’s exercise of that option, PCC 
would donate 291 acres to TPL, including the Ballona Creek channel 
acreage and the acreage in Area B containing the principal wetlands. 
PCC would also terminate its right to develop the sixty-three acre Area C 
(which the State had acquired from Summa in 1988 in settlement of state 
inheritance taxes on the Hughes estate),71 which was a part of the overall 
Revised Playa Vista Plan. Under this “dramatically reduced” approach, 
the State would end up with the majority of the Playa Vista site (about 
600 acres of the total 1,087 acres), and PCC would finally obtain a 
potentially huge infusion of cash while forgoing its rights to develop 
anywhere but Area D.72 Since Area D had always been regarded as the 
 70 See CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 2. 
 71 See Boyarsky, supra note 17. Like Area A, Area C had received 300,000 cubic yards of fill 
dredged during construction of Marina Del Rey when it was spread up to eighteen feet high. 
USEPA, Draft TDML, supra, note 2, at 46, 58 and 60. 
 72 Starting with the City’s 1993 approval of the Phase One entitlements through PPC’s 2001 
decision to sell the majority of the site to the State, dissident project opponents filed some fourteen 
separate lawsuits challenging the City’s environmental studies and project approvals for Playa Vista, 
including the Phase One EIR, the Freshwater Marsh construction permits, the DreamWorks EIR 
modifications, the Area D infrastructure financing arrangements and construction of the initial Area 
D infrastructure improvements. None of those legal challenges succeeded. See L.A. CITY PLANNING 
DEP’T, FINAL EIR FOR THE VILLAGE AT PLAYA VISTA 482-485 (2004), available at 
cityplanning.lacity.org/EIR/PlayaVista/PlayavistaFEIR/issues/VI_C.pdf. Nonetheless, on-going 
negative commentary by dissidents about Playa Vista, as well as occasional publicity stunts, such as 
dressing in frog costumes to picket the DreamWorks Building 15 news conference, generated 
considerable press attention. See, e.g., Russell, supra note 16 (dissident contends that, even if the 
Friends/MTP settlement were to achieve a “great restoration,” the project’s other impacts “should 
prevent Playa Vista from moving forward”); Wilgoren & Brooks, supra note 53 (dissident argues 
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“heart” of the Playa Vista project and included other additional potential 
development entitlements beyond those in Phase One, the scaled-back 
Playa Vista plan would still be one of the largest development projects in 
Los Angeles history.73 Nonetheless, without the more extensive and 
difficult development challenges posed by Areas A, B and C, PCC’s 
development completion time frame for Area D alone could be reduced 
to a much shorter time frame.74 
In November 2002, the voters approved Proposition 50.75 The 
immediate question became whether the State Department of Fish and 
Game, which was to manage the disbursement of the bond funds, would 
agree to purchase the Ballona Wetlands. In deciding whether to 
politically support the proposed acquisition, the Friends had many 
concerns. If it went through, the acquisition would result in a major 
change in the Revised Playa Vista Plan. Under the settlement’s Revised 
Plan, the Ballona Wetlands were to be restored using $13 million, with a 
guaranteed funding source that would fund a mid-tidal restoration. This 
approach had now been agreed to by the Friends and MTP (and later 
PCC) during the course of several years of meetings, discussions and 
accommodations. Although the long-term wetlands restoration program 
was still unrealized, MTP, PCC and the Friends had worked together to 
design and implement successful short-term restoration actions that 
brought both freshwater and saltwater to the degraded salt marsh, and 
PCC’s nearly completed construction of the freshwater marsh would 
soon be officially opened. PCC had also recently embraced its new 
lagoon-oriented, rather than marina-oriented, design for Area A. Besides 
the Friends’ legal authority under the settlement, its dunes restoration 
program and docent wetlands tours made it an important presence at the 
wetlands. All of this would potentially be foregone. Indeed, for all 
practical purposes, long-term salt marsh restoration planning for Ballona 
“it’s going to be huge amount of traffic”); Ferrell, supra note 57 (“about a dozen” dissidents 
picketed in the rain during the DreamWorks Building 15 news conference); Seema Mehta, Groups 
Trade Lawsuit Settlement for Voice, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, 
www.environmentalrelief.net/lawsuitsettlements_mehta_index_15.html (reporting that the Friends’ 
offices had been vandalized and Ruth Lansford had received death threats, while dissidents had 
accused the Friends of selling their souls); Bob Pool, Tarp That Covers Wetlands Angers 
Environmentalists, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/08/local/me-tarp8 
(reporting a dissident’s arrest for vandalism for cutting non-native trees and shrubs in the Ballona 
Wetlands); Sterngold, supra note 28 (reporting that some dissidents had “chained themselves to 
bulldozers” to protest Playa Vista construction activities). 
 73 Martha Groves, Playa Vista Plans Sharply Curtailed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, 
articles.latimes.com/2002/nov/14/local/me-playa14. 
 74 PCC saw Proposition 50 as a “funding mechanism” whereby it could finally generate 
immediate cash flow of approximately $139 million. THE PLANNING REPORT, supra note 69. 
 75 Groves, supra note 73. PCC contributed more than $830,000 to the Proposition 50 
campaign. 
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would have to start over from the beginning, as the Department of Fish 
and Game pursued its new studies and new determinations about the best 
way to comprehensively restore the Area A, B and C wetlands. Once a 
restoration plan was formulated, the source of State funds to accomplish 
the restoration was unknown. 
Nonetheless, the Friends decided to endorse acquisition of Areas A, 
B and C with the Proposition 50 monies, and they led the political 
campaign to obtain the environmental community’s support. Friends’ 
advocates noted that the acquisition would eliminate the residential 
housing in the northwest corner of Area B that they had questioned at the 
time of their 1990 settlement; that it would broaden the Area B wetlands 
restoration to include Areas A and C; and that the State should be 
presumed to be a competent and fair steward of the wetlands if it decided 
to acquire them.76 
On August 22, 2003, the State, PCC and TPL entered into an 
agreement whereby the State acquired 192 acres in Areas A and B for 
$139 million in Proposition 50 funds, PCC donated 291 acres in Area B 
and along the Ballona Creek channel to the State, and PCC released its 
development rights in Area C. At about the same time, the City issued 
the Draft EIR evaluating PCC’s proposal for developing the remaining 
unentitled portion of Area D. Called “The Village,” this smaller, greener 
111-acre final development phase would include 2,600 residential units; 
67,000 square feet of commercial office space; 150,000 square feet of 
neighborhood retail shops; and about 40,000 square feet of community-
serving uses. Thus, the entire scaled-down Playa Vista Project would be 
5,846 residential units (less than half of the approximately 13,000 units 
called for in the Revised Playa Vista Plan); 185,000 square feet of retail 
space (only about a third of the 595,000 square feet approved for the 
Revised Plan); 3.4 million square feet of commercial/office/industrial 
space (about two-thirds of the Revised Plan); and 160,000 square feet of 
community serving uses (one quarter of the Revised Plan). Basically, the 
footprint to be developed within the 1,087-acre parcel would now be 
scaled back to just 330 acres as plans for the marina and hotels in Area A 
and for other development formerly proposed for Areas B and C were 
entirely removed from the books.77 
 76 For a discussion of California’s planning and acquisition of wetlands for habitat restoration 
in Southern California, see generally Joan Hartmann, The Southern California Wetlands Recovery 
Project: The Unfolding Story, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 855, 952-53 (2000). 
 77 Groves, supra note 73; Martha Groves, State to Finalize its Purchase of Ballona Wetlands, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec.19, 2003, articles.latimes.com/2003/dec/19/local/me-ballona19; PAUL SHIGLEY, 
PLAYA VISTA GROWS, SHRINKS AND GETS READY FOR NEXT ROUND, 18 CAL. PLANNING AND DEV. 
REPORT (2003), available at www.cp-dr.com/node/704. When the parks and open space within the 
330-acre Area D developed area is taken into account, the scaled-back development footprint now 
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Playa Vista’s new President, Steve Soboroff, a former commercial 
real estate broker in Los Angeles, who took over just before the sale to 
the State was finalized, told the press that PCC would now concentrate 
on developing a reduced project that would still be a “model of the new 
urban lifestyle.”78 But the sale to the State left much about the wetlands 
restoration planning undetermined. 
VIII. PCC’S DEVELOPMENT OF AREA D AND THE STATE’S RESTORATION 
PLANNING EFFORTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE 2003 SALE 
In the nearly nine years since the State acquired Ballona Wetlands, 
PCC’s development of Area D has progressed, but the State has made 
relatively little progress on comprehensive long-term wetlands planning 
at the site. 
The first residents began moving into Playa Vista in early 2002,79 
and, to date, development of approximately 3,000 units of handsome 
low-rise condominiums and apartments, park and recreational facilities, 
and neighborhood retail stores has been completed in much of the 
western portion of Area D.80 Commercial enterprises, including the Los 
Angeles Clippers professional basketball team have moved into Area D’s 
eastern portion, where PCC has recently opened to the public its new 
eight-acre “Central Park,” designed by Michael Maltzan.81 Electronic 
Arts, the world’s largest video game publishers, has established its 
headquarters in the western part of Area D.82 In March 2010, the City 
Council approved the EIR and the entitlements needed to develop The 
Village as the now scaled-back Phase Two.83 Even though the Great 
provides fully 750 acres as parks, open space and habitat area, almost seventy-five percent of the 
1,087-acre parcel. See Parks and Open Space, PLAYA VISTA, www.PlayaVista.com/living/parks.php 
(stating that more than 750 acres of parks are available for recreation at Playa Vista) (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2012). 
 78 THE PLANNING REPORT, supra note 69. 
 79 See Martha Groves, Playa Vista Views Shared, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, 
articles.latimes.com/2002/dec/13/local/me-playa13; Stremfel, supra note 68. 
 80 Playa Vista Gets a Green Light to Phase II, THE PLANNING REPORT (Apr. 26, 2012), 
www.planningreport.com/2012/04/26/playa-vista-gets-green-light-phase-ii. As Nelson Rising had 
forecast, Playa Vista’s emphasis on environmental preservation and sustainable design principles has 
become a major part of its marketing campaign. See, e.g., L.A. TIMES Advertising Supplement, Sept. 
7, 2002. Playa Vista officials tout its “enlightened urban design principles” and point with pride to 
its receipt of the prestigious Ahwahnee Award for design excellence from the California Local 
Government Commission. See Agid, supra note 39. 
 81 See Central Park is Planned Community’s Latest Amenity, THE ARGONAUT, Apr. 4, 2010, 
www.argonautnewspaper.com/articles/2010/08/05/news_-_features/playa_vista/pv1.txt. 
 82 See Roger Vincent, Game Maker Electronic Arts Renews Lease in Playa Vista, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012, articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/19/business/la-fi-mo-playa-vista-20120118. 
 83 See David Zahnizer & Martha Groves, Playa Vista’s Second and Final Phase Wins L.A. 
City Council’s Approval, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/03/la-
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Recession continues, construction activity in The Village is expected to 
begin soon. In November 2010, the Ratkovich Company, well known 
and highly respected for its sensitive, but commercially successful, 
restoration of important historic Los Angeles properties, paid $32.4 
million for the twenty-eight acre site that DreamWorks had previously 
eyed. Ratkovich announced plans to restore the historic Hughes aircraft 
buildings as an entertainment complex featuring Building 15’s 
soundstage.84 
The settlement’s Phase One and interim wetlands restoration 
activities have now been successfully completed. In April 2003, PCC 
formally opened the fifty-one acre freshwater marsh and riparian corridor 
system,85 and it has worked well. Since its opening, more than 200 
species of birds have been attracted to the freshwater marsh, including 
some special status species returning to Ballona to nest after a seventy 
year absence.86 In 2004, a new tide gates system was installed to replace 
the older flap gates between Ballona Creek and the salt marsh, thereby 
allowing a muted tidal regime of salt and fresh water to enter and exit the 
salt marsh on an interim basis.87 The Friends obtained a non-exclusive 
council-approves-the-village-playa-vistas-second-and-final-phase.html. The City Council had 
originally approved the entitlements for The Village in April 2004, but dissident environmental 
groups filed CEQA litigation that temporarily held up the approval while various specific changes 
were made in the project EIR. Following the City Council’s March 2010 approvals, dissidents filed 
yet another CEQA challenge, but the Court of Appeals’ November 2011 decision rejected this latest 
challenge. Ballona Wetlands Trust v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 455. According to 
current PCC co-President Patti Sinclair, the 2010-approved Phase Two project was essentially 
identical to the project previously approved by the City in 2004, so the opponents had merely caused 
additional expense and delay. See THE PLANNING REPORT, supra note 80. Sinclair noted that, by 
2012, dissident groups had filed some nineteen lawsuits against Playa Vista development, including 
Phase Two, thereby causing a very “long and cumbersome” development process. Id. Ironically, the 
temporary delay occasioned by the Phase Two litigation may have inadvertently helped PCC to 
avoid bringing The Village onto the market at the bottom of the real estate trough in 2008-09. 
 84 Heather McMahon, Howard Hughes’ Airport to be Revitalized, NAT’L TRUST FOR 
HISTORIC PRES. MAG., Nov. 3, 2012, www.preservationnation.org/magazine/2010/todays-
news/howard-hughes-airport-to-be.html. 
 85 Groves, A Patch of Blue at Playa Vista, supra note 18. The completed twenty-six acre 
freshwater marsh features 3,000 trees and 10,000 shrubs and native plants. Maintenance costs are 
estimated to run between $200,000 and $500,000 annually, including occasional dredging to 
eliminate buildup of pollutants. 
 86 Returning bird species include the least bittern, a listed state species of special concern, the 
common moorhen and the Canadian goose. Ballona Habitats, FRIENDS OF BALLONA WETLANDS, 
www.ballonafriends.org/habitat_wildlife.html; BALLONA WETLANDS TRAINING MANUAL, supra 
note 13, at 24. PCC has now formally transferred title to the freshwater marsh to the State, while it 
continues to have the legal responsibility to remediate any water quality problems that may arise. 
 87 The tidal reach of the new tide gates allows the salt marsh to receive up to one meter of 
seawater. See CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, supra note 3; USEPA, DRAFT TDM, supra note 2, at 
12, 21, 36, and 39. The new tide gates assist in flood control, allow saltwater and sea life to ender the 
wetlands more naturally, and increase tidal flushing. Ballona Today, FRIENDS OF BALLONA 
WETLANDS, www.ballonafriends.org/history.html. 
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license from the State granting them the right to continue their dunes 
restoration activities and tours. Aided by a 2003 grant from the Coastal 
Conservancy, the Friends’ volunteers have now restored much of the 
dunes on the western edge of the site, transforming a vast mat of 
invasive, non-native plants into a healthy, restored dunes native habitat. 
New areas of coastal dunes buckwheat, critical habitat for the 
endangered El Segundo Dunes Blue Butterfly, have been planted. The 
extensive native plant growth established and tended by the Friends has 
flourished, creating habitat pockets for native insects, reptiles, birds, and 
small mammals.88 The presence of the threatened California legless 
lizard has been confirmed in several dunes locations, including places 
where it had not been found in twenty years.89 Working with nearby 
Loyola Marymount University, the Friends have also been raising funds 
for a Discovery Center educational facility for studying the wetlands and 
explaining them to the public. PCC and Loyola have contributed more 
than $2 million to the Discovery Center and to a three-acre Discovery 
Park that opened in late 2011 with outdoor exhibits describing the history 
and function of the wetlands.90 In 2006, Rush Lansford was awarded the 
prestigious “National Citizen Planner of the Year Award” by the 
American Planning Association, after winning the State award in 2005.91 
In contrast, the State’s comprehensive long-term wetlands 
restoration planning efforts for its now almost 600-acre portion of the 
site have moved along very slowly. When the State acquired the Ballona 
parcel, the Coastal Conservancy, which initially agreed to fund and lead 
the effort to develop a comprehensive long-term restoration plan, 
envisioned a three to five-year planning effort.92 In late 2004, the 
Conservancy’s board approved the first funds for restoration planning, 
then anticipating close to a four-year planning effort to be completed by 
2008.93 During 2004 to 2006, the Santa Monica Bay Restoration 
Commission, designated by the Department of Fish and Game as the lead 
 88 Ballona Habitats, supra note 86. 
 89 The Audubon Society’s training manual has characterized the success of the Friends’ 
dunes restoration effort as “truly remarkable.” BALLONA WETLANDS TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 
13, at 25. 
 90 The original Friends/MTP settlement provided that MTP would set aside the parklands that 
eventually became the three-acre Discovery Park. See Stipulated Settlement, supra, note 49, Exhibit 
J. 
 91 Board of Directors, FRIENDS OF BALLONA WETLANDS, www.ballonafriends.org. 
 92 CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 9. Groves, State to Finalize its Purchase of 
Ballona Wetlands, supra note 77. 
 93 BALLONA WETLANDS RESTORATION PROJECT, BALLONA WETLAND RESTORATION 
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agency for the comprehensive long-term restoration plan,94 convened a 
working group and a science advisory team (which included several of 
the Friends’ experts) to formulate project goals and alternative projects. 
Five alternatives were identified, with two selected for more detailed 
analysis.95 An environmental impact report/environmental impact 
statement (EIR/S) must now be prepared in compliance with the 
California Environmental Quality Act and the National Environmental 
Policy Act to evaluate the impact of the restoration alternatives. But the 
baseline survey of existing wetlands conditions—the starting point for an 
EIR/S analysis—did not begin until 2009. The Commission sponsored 
symposia in 2006 and 2010 to obtain public and expert comments; first, 
on the proposed restoration goals and alternatives and, later, on the 
baseline assessment study. In December 2011, the Commission finally 
released its first-year existing conditions “baseline assessment.” Further 
environmental analysis and planning will not proceed until the second-
year baseline assessment is completed. 
In January 2012, state officials approved another $6.5 million for 
technical studies and design work for the comprehensive restoration plan. 
The estimated cost to comprehensively restore Areas A, B and C has 
now grown to $100 million.96 Given the State’s current budget crisis, its 
ability to fund any sizable and viable wetlands restoration project at this 
time is problematic. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Throughout almost three decades of litigation over preservation and 
restoration of the Ballona Wetlands, the Coastal Commission has played 
a remarkably limited role. Of course, it triggered the initial litigation 
when, at perhaps the nadir of its coastal protection oversight role, it 
approved the original Summa plan. It then took essentially no role in the 
Friends/MTP settlement or its subsequent implementation. In fact, as 
various modifications of the original settlement evolved, it consistently 
remained in a hands-off position, and it rarely became involved in 
discussions about how the settlement might appropriately be modified to 
 94 Id. A collaboration of federal, state and local entities whose mission is to restore and 
enhance the Santa Monica Bay, the Commission was originally brought together under the auspices 
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in order to prepare a restoration plan for the 
entire Santa Monica Bay. About Us, SANTA MONICA BAY RESTORATION COMM’N, 
www.santamonicabay.org/About Us/aboutus.html. 
 95 Ballona Wetland Restoration Planning Process, BALLONA WETLANDS RESTORATION 
PROJECT, (Santa Monica Bay Restoration Found.), Dec. 2010. 
 96 Tony Barboza, California OKs $6.5 Million to Plan Ballona Wetlands Restoration, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/21/local/la-me-ballona-wetlands-20120121. 
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take account of subsequent events.97 
Almost thirty years of Ballona Wetlands litigation provide a 
uniquely useful primer on the practical opportunities and limits of public 
interest litigation to stop destructive urban development projects and to 
accomplish restoration goals. For years, the Friends’ litigation 
successfully blocked Summa’s ill-conceived project. With the political 
cooperation of Los Angeles City Council member Galanter and others, 
the litigation brought about an extraordinary settlement, providing for a 
landmark wetlands protection and restoration program, as well as a 
redesigned, “smart growth” Playa Vista development project that would 
pay for the settlement’s wetlands preservation and restoration program 
actions. The settlement’s provisions for private wetlands restoration 
funding, for respectful reconciliation of opposing interests and concerns, 
and for surmounting bureaucratic obstacles, presented abundant potential 
for accomplishing wetlands restoration. 
The Friends have been largely successful in accomplishing the 
important habitat restoration: construction of the freshwater marsh to 
reintroduce abundant quantities of fresh water into the marsh, installation 
of a new tidal gates system to restore substantial ocean tidal flows, and 
extensive restoration of the dunes habitat. Together, these have restored 
vitality within much of the habitat. 
But the settlement’s long-term wetlands restoration goals, which 
were tied to the post-Phase One build out of Playa Vista, have not been 
achieved. A scaled down Playa Vista continues to be developed as a 
master planned community featuring the hallmarks of sustainable, smart 
growth. But, from the beginning, MTP/PCC’s more ambitious 
development proposals proved to be financially flawed. Their proposed 
Playa Vista project was too big, too loaded with huge infrastructure 
costs, and too lacking in smaller, incremental development steps that 
could provide more private revenue. In hindsight, both MTP and PCC 
spent too much of their time and resources romancing DreamWorks. 
Although a public agency’s purchase of land threatened by urban 
development is often seen as a panacea for achieving ultimate resource 
protection, this has not yet been the case with the Ballona Wetlands. 
When it acquired Areas A, B and C, the State was overly optimistic 
about how quickly it could start a comprehensive long-term restoration 
program, and it underestimated the costs. The State’s bureaucratic 
 97 The CCC has also consistently rebuffed efforts to bring it into controversies generated by 
dissident groups and individuals about the proposed Playa Vista development and wetlands 
restoration. See, e.g., CAL. COASTAL COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: REVOCATION REQUEST (2001), 
available at www.coastal.ca.gov/lb/5-91-463A2.pdf (recommending denial of dissident’s effort to 
obtain CCC revocation of freshwater marsh construction permits). 
26
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol6/iss1/5
2012] PROTECTING THE BALLONA WETLANDS  51 
planning process has lumbered along, and it has not yet directly 
confronted the inevitable political maneuvering by dissident groups and 
individuals, who have played little constructive role in bringing about 
desirable, practical solutions. Can the State now move its comprehensive 
long-term wetlands planning program forward promptly, efficiently and 
in a scientifically credible, fact-based manner? While the State’s 
comprehensive planning process continues, can it also take additional 
interim steps to enhance habitat productivity? Can it finance the 
comprehensive long-term restoration costs that are now estimated to total 
upwards of nine figures? These are important questions that no one can 
answer, but, the State will confront a difficult challenge. 
Throughout it all, one constant remains. Despite the setbacks and 
damage inflicted on the Ballona Wetlands, they have been remarkably 
resilient. If the State can now follow through on its comprehensive long-
term restoration planning efforts, the potential for a thriving, restored 
coastal wetlands habitat at the Ballona Wetlands remains achievable. 
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